Is Honduras Facing a Coup?

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

Honduras is undergoing a very turbulent electoral process, something not unusual for the Northern Triangle. President Xiomara Castro suffered a wide defeat in the last elections, but seems unwilling to give up power. This becomes particularly interesting, given Trump’s expressed interest in this electoral process. Irregularities are common; however, Honduras might be facing an autogolpe, or a self-coup, where LIBRE refuses to accept defeat.

In this issue, you will find:

• Rare Earths Could Pull Latin America Back Toward Washington

• America’s Foreign Students are Still Going Strong Under Trump, for Now

• Electoral Destabilization: The Struggle for Victory

• What We’re Watching

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For the first time since Bolsonaro left, Washington and Brasília are speaking the same language, and it isn’t the language of diplomacy but of minerals. 

State of Affairs. Rare earths have quietly become the hinge of a geopolitical opening that neither the Trump administration nor the Lula government can afford to waste. Behind the sudden thaw between two leaders who spent much of 2025 publicly clashing lies a structural reality: China’s dominance of critical minerals has become a strategic vulnerability for the United States, and Brazil is one of the few countries capable of reshaping the balance.

• The reopening of the Brazil–U.S. critical minerals dialogue in Washington last week signaled that the White House sees Latin America not just as a neighborhood, but as a necessary extension of its industrial security architecture.

• The United States may dominate the hemisphere militarily, but it does not control the minerals that power clean energy, advanced weaponry and AI manufacturing. China does. 

• And that asymmetry has become intolerable for an administration openly pursuing economic warfare against Beijing.

Why it Matters. Brazil, meanwhile, sits on the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves and controls a mining portfolio that touches nearly every high-tech supply chain: niobium for aerospace, lithium and graphite for batteries, nickel and cobalt for EVs, and copper for global electrification. In every sector where Washington needs to diversify, Brasília has something to offer. The USD 465 million U.S. Development Finance Corporation loan to Serra Verde in November was not an isolated gesture but a preview of an industrial partnership with geopolitical weight.

• The question is whether this emerging alignment can shift regional alliances at a moment when China remains Latin America’s top trading partner. 

• For years, Beijing filled a vacuum left by U.S. strategic neglect. Trump’s return to office has reversed that complacency, but his approach to the region is harder and far more transactional. In Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico, pressure has replaced persuasion. 

• Yet if Washington wants to reduce China’s mineral leverage, it cannot alienate the one country whose geological map can actually weaken it.

Yes, But. Brazil knows this and intends to use it. Lula’s government wants guarantees that a rare-earth partnership will not relegate Brazil to the old role of extraction economy. It seeks processing facilities, technological upgrading, preferential access to the U.S. market and joint R&D—the pillars needed to break the cycle of exporting ore and importing dependency. 

• For its part, Washington wants proof that Brazil can become a reliable alternative to Chinese-controlled supply chains without drifting deeper into Beijing’s political orbit.

Between the Lines. What emerges is a paradox: Trump’s hard-line posture toward Latin America may make diplomatic coordination more volatile, yet it increases Brazil’s leverage in negotiations. The United States needs Brazil more than Brazil needs the United States. And that shift, if handled strategically, could tilt the regional balance subtly back toward Washington. For years, Brazil’s foreign policy sought equidistance between global powers, but mineral diplomacy introduces asymmetry. 

• China can buy commodities; the United States can provide technology, financing, security guarantees and access to high-value industrial ecosystems. 

• That combination, if structured properly, can reshape Brazilian incentives.

What Follows. Whether this becomes a broader regional realignment depends on execution. A credible rare-earth partnership would allow Washington to demonstrate that its renewed attention to Latin America is not merely coercive but economically transformative. It would also show that the U.S. can compete with China through investment rather than warnings. For Brazil, success would mean autonomy: the ability to leverage both superpowers while avoiding dependency on either.

• In a hemisphere where alliances increasingly hinge on supply chains rather than ideology, rare earths may be the first true test of whether the United States can re-anchor Latin America in its strategic orbit. 

• If Washington treats the relationship as a partnership instead of a procurement exercise, the outcome could redefine U.S.–Brazil relations for a generation.

• This will determine whether the West can win the contest for the infrastructure of the future—and whether Latin America becomes a passive arena for great-power rivalry or an active shaper of the emerging geopolitical order.

The latest visa data contradicts the prevailing narrative: despite Trump’s aggressive cuts to research budgets and tightening of student-visa policies, foreign enrollment in the U.S.—especially at the master’s level—has not fallen off a cliff.

State of Affairs. The graph shows stability, even slight growth, since Trump’s return to office. But focusing only on the absence of an immediate enrollment crash misses the deeper point. America’s scientific dominance has always rested on a pipeline of global talent feeding into R&D labs, tech startups and universities. Stability today does not guarantee resilience tomorrow.

• Restrictions that make it harder to study, work or remain in the country may not show up instantly in visa numbers, but they do shape how students and firms plan their futures.

• Put simply: these curves lag behind policy reality, and the real test—whether foreign researchers stay after graduating—has barely begun.

Why it matters. The stakes for U.S. private innovation are enormous. Nearly half of America’s STEM graduate students are foreign-born, and in fields like AI, advanced materials, quantum research and semiconductors, the proportion is even higher. These are the sectors the U.S. needs most urgently to outcompete China. If future cohorts begin to interpret America as politically volatile, financially inhospitable, or administratively hostile, the private sector will feel it first: fewer postdocs in labs, fewer engineers for deep-tech startups, fewer researchers willing to commit to long-term projects.

• Venture capital depends on the gravitational pull of American universities, and that gravitational field weakens long before enrollment collapses.

• A world where top STEM talent chooses Canada, the U.K., Germany or South Korea instead would be a world where U.S. technological primacy becomes much harder to defend.

Between the Lines. Universities are also entering a new ideological phase. Trump’s pressure on academic institutions—budget cuts, cultural-war oversight boards, restrictions on DEI-related programs—may not deter international students immediately, but it reshapes campus life in ways that affect America’s soft-power advantage. Foreign students don’t only come for labs; they come for a cultural ecosystem that values openness, mobility, and intellectual plurality.

• If universities become battlegrounds for ideological discipline rather than engines of scientific freedom, the U.S. risks eroding one of its most powerful diplomatic assets: the reproduction of global elites trained in American norms.

• Losing that ideological export capacity would be a geopolitical setback. China, with its state-backed scholarships and expanding research ecosystem, is already competing for those same minds.

• This problem, however, is not endemic to the Trump Administration. On the contrary, it might be solved by balancing out a very much politicized campus life, promoting during Democrat presidencies.

Regional Echoes. For Latin America, the implications run even deeper. The region relies on U.S.-trained scientists, economists, engineers, and policymakers who return home carrying cutting-edge expertise and a worldview aligned with democratic capitalism. If the U.S. becomes less accessible or less attractive, that flow diminishes. Worse, China becomes the default alternative.

• A decline in Latin American enrollment in U.S. programs would weaken U.S. influence over the region’s future technological and institutional development.

• Even if the numbers still look stable, the strategic question is not where the lines are today—but where they point.

• The danger is not an enrollment shock; it is a slow realignment of talent, ideology, and innovation away from the United States at the precise moment when Washington needs them most.

Elections in Honduras advance amid narrow margins, accumulated distrust, and an under-pressure umpire—the National Electoral Council (CNE).

In perspective. What was expected to be a technical finish has turned into a heated dispute in which each actor attempts to define narratively what it means to “win” before the official count concludes. In a climate where legitimacy depends more on perceptions than procedures, the country enters a phase in which stability will depend less on votes and more on each party’s ability to impose its version of reality. The Honduran contest arrives marked by tension between fragile institutions and a citizenry demanding results amid a clear vote of punishment.

• The constant delegitimization of the CNE and, in particular, the counting system (TREP) eroded public trust early on and prepared the ground for any result to be questioned.

• On that board, Marlon Ochoa became the central destabilizing figure: Libre’s political operator within the CNE, foreseeing the party’s defeat, prevented any minimal consensus on the count. Proving fraud was unnecessary; it was enough to apply pressure on the most vulnerable point of the process—the count—to delegitimize the entire result.

• Even the stabilization attempts by the other two councilwomen were trapped within a broader tactic. Ochoa’s objective was not to harm them directly, but to generate enough chaos to discredit the electoral process.

How it works. The Honduran electoral dynamic expresses itself through structural tensions within the political system. The instability of a single-round, first-past-the-post system—where a candidate can win by simple plurality—turns any narrow margin into a vulnerability. There is no institutional mechanism for a runoff, and the winner’s legitimacy depends almost entirely on trust in the count.

• Both the PLH and PNH consider themselves potential winners: the Liberals project that challenges may reverse their deficit, while the Nationalists are prepared to defend their own nullification claims.

• Neither wants to delegitimize the election outright because both see a plausible path to victory.

• Libre operates as a destabilizing force. The party seeks to create a scenario in which Asfura’s likely victory is wrapped in sufficient doubt over the TREP and the broader scrutiny process to push the narrative that the elections must be annulled.

Regional echoes. U.S. foreign-policy lenses have reshaped the stakes of the Honduran election and its international narrative. Washington’s posture indirectly impacted the electoral race, likely conceding a slight advantage to the candidate able to mobilize turnout through rural clientelist networks—spaces where loyal Juan Orlando voters are concentrated.

• The international narrative has already shown its first fracture. Trump’s calculated pardons—especially that of the former convicted Honduran president—destabilize Washington’s moral authority on anti-narcotics policy but remain consistent with broader U.S. national security objectives.

• Mel Zelaya has capitalized on U.S. animosity toward Nasralla by publicly endorsing his victory—an intentional move to associate Nasralla with Libre and thereby delegitimize the broader process.

• By blurring partisan lines, Mel’s strategy pushes the election toward annulment: if Nasralla is framed as Libre-aligned, U.S. backing becomes contradictory, and the intended outcome—Asfura’s victory—becomes politically unsustainable.

Between the lines. The next Honduran government will be shaped less by ideology than by how it fits into U.S. strategic needs. The next president’s first test will be migration control. Washington expects Tegucigalpa to help contain outward flows and manage the corridor as part of a broader effort to shield U.S. labor markets during a new reindustrialization cycle and stabilize domestic politics around the border debate.

• That alignment will be enforced through multiple pressure points. Honduras has a systemic dependence on remittances—sensitive to Federal Reserve monetary policy, banking regulation, and any future taxation schemes—and on its capacity to export critical agro-industrial goods that can help cushion U.S. inflation in a tariff-heavy global environment. Both levers can be calibrated to reward cooperation or punish deviation.

• The next president will not only have to manage a contested election result, but also negotiate how far the country is willing to subordinate its internal choices to U.S. security and geoeconomic priorities.

In conclusion. Honduras’s electoral turbulence unfolds at a moment when U.S. foreign policy faces mounting structural pressures. Europe’s stagnation has heightened Washington’s need for reliable nearshoring corridors and access to raw materials, while the Americas regain strategic weight as a buffer against global uncertainty.

• Within this framework, Honduras is not merely another electoral hotspot, but a geoeconomic hinge where migration flows, narcotrafficking routes, and political volatility converge with the operational importance of Palmerola Air Base.

• For the United States, the core question is no longer solely who wins the presidency, but whether the country can preserve enough institutional coherence to remain a predictable partner in a region where instability carries continental consequences.

What We’re Watching 🔎 . . .

Disguised and in Danger: How a Nobel Peace Prize Winner Escaped Venezuela [link]

José de Córdoba, Vera Bergengruen, and Alex Leary, The Wall Street Journal

María Corina Machado’s clandestine escape from Venezuela this week underscores both the regime’s repression and the opposition’s growing internationalization. Disguised and moving through multiple military checkpoints, Machado fled by boat to Curaçao before flying to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, an operation quietly known to Washington amid an expanding U.S. military presence in the Caribbean.

Her departure carries risks: exile has historically weakened the domestic leverage of opposition leaders, and Caracas has warned that she could be barred from returning. Yet allies argue the opposite—that operating from abroad will amplify pressure on Nicolás Maduro, allowing Machado to mobilize European governments and Washington more effectively than from hiding. The episode highlights a strategic shift: Venezuela’s opposition increasingly betting that international diplomacy, sanctions, and credible external pressure—not internal protest alone—will determine the regime’s fate.

The U.S. Gave Mexico a List of Russian Spies. Mexico Let Them Stay [link]

Maria Abi-Habib, The New York Times

Washington has long warned that Mexico has become a permissive environment for Russian intelligence operations, a claim publicly dismissed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2022 despite repeated private briefings from U.S. officials. According to multiple American and Mexican sources, the CIA identified more than two dozen Russian operatives posing as diplomats in Mexico City, but expulsions never followed. Mexico’s strategic value—proximity to the U.S., massive tourism flows, and comparatively weak counterintelligence focused on domestic crime—has made it an ideal hub for espionage and information handoffs beyond Washington’s surveillance reach.

The issue extends beyond intelligence. Russia has paired covert activity with disinformation campaigns and diplomatic courtship, exploiting Mexico’s tradition of neutrality and leftist mistrust of U.S. power. As the Trump administration reasserts a Monroe Doctrine–style posture, Mexico’s tolerance of Russian presence risks becoming a strategic fault line in hemispheric security.