Where Did the Harris Campaign Go Wrong?

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM). This is a somewhat special issue, as we are observing Independence Day weekend in most Central American nations.

In this issue, you will find:

•Where Did the Harris Campaign Go Wrong?

•Uruguay’s Unconventional Election

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The GCaM Team

•Where Did the Harris Campaign Go Wrong?
718 words | 4 minutes reading time

Despite her initial momentum, Vice President Kamala Harris’ campaign has lost steam in the final stretch. The race is widely regarded as a coin flip, with the Trump campaign maintaining its cautious optimism.

Panorama. With only four days to go until the election, the outcome remains uncertain. What is certain is that the Democrats’ momentum, which carried them through August, has dissipated, perhaps granting former President Donald Trump an advantage. Harris is likely to win the popular vote, but she has seen a fall in her chances of reaching the all-important figure of 270 electoral votes. 

• Harris entered the race with great vigor, improving on President Joe Biden’s numbers by up to 8%. The much-maligned Biden’s withdrawal, followed by the enthusiasm of the Democratic National Convention, gave her an initial push that frightened Republican observers.

• However, Harris’ popular vote advantage over Donald Trump, which grew as high as 3%, has fallen to a narrow 1.1%, with the former president trending upward. The particularities of U.S. demographics effectively require the Democrats to secure a greater proportion of the popular vote, so this does not bode well for the Harris campaign.

• The data is even more discouraging in swing states like Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina, where Harris’ chances are now exceedingly slight. The reversal of the Harris-favoring trend in the all-important State of Pennsylvania, where Trump now commands a small lead, reinforces this phenomenon.
  
  

Between the Lines. It may be too early to write campaign postmortems, as Harris may yet go on to win, but it is clear that the Democrats did not provide what the election cycle demanded. From initially supporting Biden’s reelection to focusing its campaign on a message of change, the party was never able to put forward a winning message. 

• Harris has been unable to distance herself from the unpopular Biden administration. Despite being the incumbent vice president, she has effectively depicted herself as a challenger, hence her failing to convince the electorate.

• It was, of course, a complex situation. Harris needed to distinguish herself from Biden without delegitimizing her party, which effectively organized a last-minute coup against Biden, its then-candidate.

• An aggressive campaign exclusively blaming Biden for America’s troubles—inflation, immigration, housing affordability, etc.—would have favored her messaging strategy. However, this “betrayal” could have harmed her standing with the Democratic base. It would, in any case, have been seen as cynical.
  
  

Highlights. Although Kamala Harris is likely to outperform Trump in popular vote terms, she is not expected to reach Biden’s 2020 numbers. Trump’s voters, in contrast, are likely to grow, largely as a result of his improved performance with minority groups, particularly Hispanics, and college-educated whites, who have shifted towards Trump vis-à-vis their 2020 voting behavior.

• The Democratic campaign has spoken of Harris as a sort of panacea for the country’s economic and immigration problems. Voters remain somewhat skeptical. Rightly or wrongly, they associate these crises with the Biden administration. 

• The Harris campaign has also relied on demonizing Trump. Trump was deemed a would-be tyrant, thus excusing Harris’ potential shortcomings as a candidate. This Ciceronian defense portraying Harris as the last defender of the American Republic has largely failed to take hold, except among particularly abortion-inclined voters.

• It is hardly surprising, then, that the Democratic campaign’s leading issue remains abortion, which is a priority for many female voters. Some Republicans had underestimated the salience of this issue, with Trump attempting to strike a middle ground.
  
  

Balance. Harris never had it easy; optimistic campaigns are always difficult for unpopular incumbents. The Democrats, however, did not grasp that in spite of a substantial portion of the electorate’s outright rejection of Trump, the Biden administration’s four years in power have generated a similar, if not more pronounced, degree of distrust.

• It is, of course, difficult to make an informed prediction. The election remains close-fought and depends on a few states, above all Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, as things stand, polls and election models favor Trump.

• Harris and her party have failed to persuade the small, but increasingly crucial, number of undecided voters. Many of these Americans will either vote for Trump—some will, perhaps, hold their nose as they do so—or stay at home.

• Definitive campaign autopsies must wait until after the election’s result is clear. That said, if Harris loses, she will surely look back on her messaging errors—and perhaps regret her choice of Tim Walz, rather than Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, as running mate.
  
  

•Uruguay’s Unconventional Election
624 words | 3 minutes reading time

Uruguay’s presidential runoff will take place on November 24. Following the first round last Sunday, the choice is now between the establishment conservatism of Álvaro Delgado and the muscular social democracy of Yamandú Orsi, who offers a partial return to the policies of former President José “Pepe” Mujica.

Panorama. With President Luis Lacalle Pou’s five-year term coming to a close, Uruguay’s stability was showcased by the campaign’s calm and conciliatory tone. Neither Delgado (National Party/Republican Coalition, center-right) nor Orsi (Broad Front, center-left) reached the 50 percent threshold, making a runoff necessary.

• Delgado, who formerly served as Lacalle’s Secretary of the Presidency, reached 27% of the vote, while Orsi, Mujica’s anointed candidate, came close to an outright victory, reaching 44% of the vote.

• Beyond this, Andrés Ojeda (Colorado Party, big-tent), came in with 16% of the vote. His campaign was unusually aggressive and vigorous for Uruguayan standards.

• His level of support, while insufficient to make it to the runoff, is indicative of a fraying in the National Party-Broad Front bipartisan system. Ojeda nonetheless endorsed Delgado, who will now attempt to ward off the left.
  
  

Highlights. Polls show that Orsi is the favorite to win the November runoff. Although Uruguay maintains a stable economy, with a relatively high GDP per capita and a low Gini coefficient (income inequality) for regional standards, crime, particularly murder and theft, has boomed in the past decade. Between 2013 and 2023, the country saw a 41.8% increase in its murder rate.

• In 2013, the homicide rate stood at 7.9 victims per 100,000 inhabitants, only slightly higher than in the United States; by 2023, the figure had risen to 11.2 per 100,000 inhabitants.

• Uruguay remains one of the safest countries in Latin America, but security has become a political priority for Uruguayans.

• Nonetheless, security is widely expected to improve. This trend largely favors Orsi, whose social democratic policies many voters find appealing. There are historical reasons for this, as Uruguay has had some form of a welfare state for over a century.
  
  

Between the Lines. The relative parity between Delgado and Orsi was expected; Ojeda’s emergence as a serious challenger remains the most notable event of the 2024 presidential campaign. The 40-year-old lawyer is the ruling Republican Coalition’s enfant terrible. It is largely because of him that the coalition was unable to back a single presidential nominee. Indeed, in 2019, it ran a united front, managing to unseat the Broad Front after 15 years in power.

• The coalition has been effective in the General Assembly, Uruguay’s legislature, but the division between the National Party and the Colorado Party, which was formerly much more politically relevant, has strengthened Orsi and the Broad Front.

• Ojeda, a charismatic, disruptive, and irreverent politician, represents a Latin American archetype that has long been absent in Uruguay. Ideologically, he may be deemed a reformist conservative, although this remains an imprecise description.

• The establishment regards him with concern and occasional derision. He cuts a somewhat Milei-like figure and is routinely accused of being an opportunistic populist without a clear message.
  
  

Balance. Despite failing to reach the runoff, Ojeda is an indication of a sociopolitical change in one of the most cohesive, moderate, and stable countries in the region. Uruguay, which mixes a low-tax, generally pro-business attitude with a long-running welfare state, may soon enter a new stage in its political history, with Ojeda standing against a political system that may be characterized as dry, staid, and almost exclusively concerned with day-to-day management.

• Uninspiring as it may be to some, the Uruguayan system has proved remarkably resilient, yet Ojeda’s rise serves as proof of some level of underground dissatisfaction. 

• One must not exaggerate his impact. After all, power will once again fall to either the National Party or the Broad Front. Nonetheless, the former can only win with Ojeda’s support; his political stature can only rise.