Under Trump, Cuba Returns to the Forefront in U.S. Policy

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

•Under Trump, Cuba Returns to the Forefront in U.S. Policy

•Rains and Droughts Showcase Latin America’s Infrastructure Gap

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Under Trump, Cuba Returns to the Forefront in U.S. Policy
823 words | 4 minutes reading time

Days ago, the Castro regime turned 66. Recent moves in the incoming White House suggest the passage of time has, if anything, increased Cuba’s salience in U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. Yet the island-nation no longer houses Soviet warheads; its continued relevance is owed to Trump-supporting Cuban Americans.

Panorama. Many of Donald Trump’s appointments to Latin America and Spain share a striking commonality: their Cuban origin. From his Ambassador to Spain to the Secretary of State himself, several Cuban Americans count themselves among the president-elect’s petit comité for U.S. policy as it relates to the Hispanosphere.

• So far, five of Trump’s new senior foreign policy officials are Americans of Cuban descent; growing speculation suggests more may soon follow. 

• Trump, anxious to avoid the mistakes of his first term, often repeats Reagan’s dictum that “personnel is policy.” Cuban Americans’ hallowed place in his administration shows he will adopt a hardline attitude vis-à-vis Latin America’s left-leaning regimes.

• With the United States seeking to safeguard its backyard, reinvigorate the Monroe Doctrine, and foil what it sees as Beijing’s cunning designs, Trump is an ill omen for the Cuban regime and its regional allies.
  
  

Archive. Washington has been hostile towards Cuba since 1959. Throughout the decades, the trade embargo, in force since 1960, has been the primary weapon in its arsenal. Obama eased restrictions on the island, as part of rapprochement efforts that led, controversially, to the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Havana. During his first term, Trump partially reversed some of these changes.

• There are those who consider the embargo to be futile. For them, allowing trade with Cuba would foster development, easing the current exodus and fostering a business-oriented sector with the ability to challenge the government and clamor for reforms.

• Conservative Cuban Americans tend to see this view as naïve, if not outright regime-endorsing. Some believe, perhaps with a surfeit of optimism, that the regime is on its last legs, with sanctions relief serving only as life support.

• Studies suggest the country lost 18% of its population between 2022 and 2023. Its profound demographic crisis and crumbled, not crumbling, infrastructure make development exceedingly difficult, even with reforms and outright trade normalization.
  
  

Highlights. The future Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and Mauricio Claver-Carone, Special Envoy for Latin America, were both strong opponents of Obama’s stance on Cuba. They will hold significant influence over U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Ambassadors Peter Lamelas (Argentina), Kevin Marino Cabrera (Panama), and Benjamín León, Jr. (Spain) will have their eyes set not only on Cuba, but also on Nicaragua and Venezuela.

• It is possible that former USAID Assistant Administrator John Barsa, who is the son of Cuban exiles, may return to lead the development agency, which is often maligned, justly or not, by Latin American conservatives.

• Carlos Trujillo, also the son of Cuban exiles, is expected to be appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. If this comes to pass, he would not constrain himself to the Caracas-Havana-Managua axis; years ago, for instance, he accused former Bolivian President Evo Morales of electoral fraud. 

• As a response to these expected appointments, Biden struck Cuba from the list of States Sponsors of Terrorism. The current president’s poisoned dart will be the first challenge faced by Trump’s Western Hemisphere staff.
  
  

Between the Lines. The Cuban community has been pivotal in both of Trump’s elections, transforming Florida—once a swing state—into a Republican stronghold. As a result of this support, U.S. policy in the hemisphere will be defined by a zero-tolerance approach towards Latin America’s left-leaning regimes.

• Havana remains important: Cuba lacks the financial firepower to back other regimes, and it can no longer muster the strength to intervene in distant locales like Angola, but it acts as a sort of ideological lodestar.

• Cuba’s intelligence services, although far removed from their Cold War heyday, continue to be regarded as some of the most sophisticated in Latin America. It is well-known that Cuban advisors figure prominently in Caracas. 

• This is particularly relevant in light of revelations that senior U.S. diplomat Víctor Manuel Rocha was a Cuban spy for many years. The Yale-educated Rocha, a former ambassador to Bolivia, had previously enjoyed a golden retirement, joining the Council on Foreign Relations and being fêted in the Dominican Republic.
  
  

Yes, But. The young and fragmented Venezuelan diaspora has been unable to gain Cuban-style backing from Republican lawmakers. This has much to do with the Caracas regime’s age and the special consideration Cubans are afforded under U.S. immigration law. Nonetheless, Venezuelans in the United States are, much like Cuban Americans, rabid opponents of their country’s regime.

• The United States may approach Maduro in a different manner. A further deterioration of the country’s economy would not only harm the regime, but also push Venezuela to trek towards the U.S.-Mexico border, something Trump will not countenance. 

• A further complication is that Washington’s chief weapon against Venezuela would be the suspension of special licenses for U.S. oil giants operating in the country. This would hurt the likes of Chevron, but it could also affect energy prices.

Rains and Droughts Showcase Latin America’s Infrastructure Gap
773 words | 4 minutes reading time

Latin America’s crumbling infrastructure has been put on display by climate-related disasters. Time and time again, recurring phenomena like El Niño have wreaked havoc, as recently seen with the Panama Canal, whose geopolitical significance cannot be overstated. A possible intensification of these weather events does not bode well for the region. 

Panorama. Neither infrastructure gaps nor climate-related disasters are new issues, but in 2024, the consequences the latter had on the former turned the issue into a key regional concern. 

• In September, Ecuador’s center-right president, Daniel Noboa, who at the time enjoyed an approval rating above 50%, suffered a major setback after draughts kept hydroelectric dams from operating, leading to blackouts that lasted up to 14 hours a day for several weeks. This has reinvigorated the left, which may return to power.

• In Brazil, Porto Alegre was devastated by floods that ultimately forced the closure of its main airport for six months. 

• Brazil also faced severe droughts, causing Amazon tributaries to drop to their lowest levels in 120 years. This crisis affected 400,000 children in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, who, per UNICEF, were left without access to education and healthcare.
  
  

Ever-Growing Gaps. According to the Global Infrastructure Hub, a G20 initiative, Latin America spent 2.2% of its GDP on infrastructure in 2023. Experts believe the region needs to invest at least 3.1% of its GDP annually to close the gap and steal a march on emerging markets in Asia, which remain more competitive.

• Leaving aside the fact that many of the region’s governments operate under significant fiscal constraints, infrastructure has in many cases not been a priority. Budgets are not only low; they are often not even disbursed. 

• For instance, Guatemala’s 2024 budget execution report revealed that the Ministry of Communications, Infrastructure, and Housing spent only 70.67% of its allocated budget. Local anti-corruption efforts have, despite their commendable intentions, further delayed state investment.
  
  

Political Taboo. For cash-strapped governments, a common solution has been to implement public-private partnerships (PPPs). Political opposition to toll roads, typically cloaked in language opposing “neoliberalism” and privatizations, have rendered these arrangements controversial in some countries, with the decade-old Odebrecht corruption scandal still weighing heavy on the regional imagination.

• Even so, most PPPs are not perennial, and governments have at times failed to maintain privately built assets that fall into their hands. In Guatemala, the Palín-Escuintla highway, the country’s chief commercial thoroughfare, was largely incident-free for 25 years until the state assumed control in May 2023. 

• In a crowd-pleasing maneuver, then-President Alejandro Giammattei’s government abolished tolls—and failed to adequately maintain the highway. The resulting rainfall and sediment accumulation led to a large, enormously disruptive sinkhole appearing in June 2024.

• Repairs, overseen by the country’s new government with private-sector cooperation, are still ongoing.
  
  

Yes, But. Admittedly, some countries seek to buck the trend. Last May, Chile announced $17 billion, or 5.25% of its 2023 GDP, in public works concessions to be allocated between 2024 and 2028. Peru, which now enjoys a delicate respite from the political instability of recent years, has plans for 80 infrastructure projects.

• Some of these, like the recently completed Port of Chancay, are bound to raise suspicion in Washington. Infrastructure in the region is increasingly tied to China, which has a unique appetite for large-scale projects. Against the prevailing narrative, the chief complaint against Beijing is not its debt-trap diplomacy, but its tendency to deliver less investment than promised.

• Other countries’ misfortune may also turn into a godsend for their neighbors. Under former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Mexico broke ground on its Interoceanic Corridor, which seeks to compete with the Panama Canal. 

• Some of AMLO’s projects, which have now been left in his successor’s hands, are undoubtedly white elephants. Delays and costly overruns are aplenty, yet this willingness to build and invest is somewhat refreshing in a region given to paralysis.
  
  

Between the Lines. The Inter-American Development Bank has said that climate-related disasters could reduce GDP by up to 0.9% in smaller countries and by as much as 3.6% in Caribbean nations, potentially driving millions to seek greener pastures. As it stands, economic growth in Latin America remains mediocre if one considers its relatively low incomes, which usually allow for catch-up gains.

• According to the WFP, El Niño caused prolonged droughts and water shortages in the Central American Dry Corridor, Bolivia, and Colombia, while also bringing heavy rainfall and flooding to the coasts of Ecuador, Peru, and inland Bolivia.

• Little exists in the way of preventative infrastructure to limit the consequences of droughts and floods, without which economic development will continue to prove elusive.

• From a U.S. point of view, such development is entirely desirable, as it would limit migration pressures and presumably imbue Latin American nations with greater resilience and state capacity.