UN to experiment on Haiti

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

• Haiti: testing the UN’s new watchmen model

• The U.S. in expansion in the technology value chain

• What We’re Watching

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The GCaM Team

Haiti’s deepening collapse has forced the United Nations into a new phase of engagement; one, however, as uncertain as all previous efforts.

In perspective. After 15 months of an underfunded, understaffed Kenyan-led police mission that failed to dent gang control, the Security Council voted 12-0 to approve a U.S.-backed proposal for a larger, militarized deployment of up to 5500 troops. Branded the “Gang Suppression Force,” the mission is a direct response to spiraling violence in Port-au-Prince, where gangs control most neighborhoods and state authority has all but evaporated. 

• Russia, China, and Pakistan abstained, signaling discomfort but not outright opposition.
  
  

• The force reflects both Haiti’s dire security vacuum and Washington’s determination to prevent regional spillover.
  
  

• It is tasked with confronting gangs directly, securing critical infrastructure, and supporting fragile Haitian institutions that remain incapable of exercising sovereignty.

Between the lines. The new deployment represents a departure from traditional UN peacekeeping. It will not be commanded by the Department of Peace Operations but by a committee of contributing states plus the U.S. and Canada, effectively embedding Washington and Ottawa at the center of decision-making. Funding and personnel will still come from voluntary contributions, but a new UN support office will handle logistics and financial coordination to prevent the dysfunction that crippled the Kenya-led mission.

• Crucially, the mandate authorizes the force to conduct offensive operations independently of the Haitian police. This recognizes that the Haitian National Police and armed forces are too weak, corrupt, or compromised to lead security operations. 
  
  

• The mission is also empowered to secure airports, ports, schools, and hospitals—a clear sign that international forces will step into state functions, which is crucial since the Haitian government has focused on striking lower-level gang members while leaving the big fish unbothered. The focus on illicit arms trafficking highlights external drivers of Haiti’s crisis: most of the guns fueling the gangs originate in the U.S.
  
  

• But legitimacy is a lingering question. Haitians are wary of foreign troops after past interventions left legacies of abuse, dependency, and scandals like the cholera outbreak during MINUSTAH. 

Why it matters. Haiti has become a litmus test for the future of multilateral interventions. Unlike peacekeeping missions designed to monitor ceasefires or support fragile peace processes, this deployment is aimed at dismantling violent non-state actors who dominate an urban battlefield. If it succeeds, it could become a model for confronting criminal violence in failed states. If it fails, it will reinforce skepticism about whether the UN system can deliver in complex crises.

• For Washington, the stakes are immediate. The Biden and Trump administrations alike recognized that Haiti’s instability drives migration flows, cross-border trafficking, and potential spillovers into the Caribbean basin. 
  
  

• By taking leadership in the new force, the U.S. ensures it can shape outcomes directly—both to secure its sphere of influence and to demonstrate global leadership at a time when China and Russia are offering competing models of engagement.
  
  

• For regional actors, the mission offers both reassurance and risk. The Dominican Republic has warned repeatedly that Haiti’s collapse is a national security threat. CARICOM states fear migration waves and organized crime reaching their shores. 

The bottom line. The “Gang Suppression Force” embodies the contradictions of today’s multilateralism; it is bold in mandate, fragile in resources, and deeply political in design. It reflects Washington’s capacity to mobilize the UN when its interests are at stake, but also the reluctance of other powers to share full responsibility.

• Haiti’s future now hinges on whether international troops can re-establish a semblance of order, support political transition, and rebuild trust in public institutions. 
  
  

• Failure would not only condemn Haiti to further chaos but also deal another blow to the credibility of multilateralism. Success would demonstrate that the UN can still adapt to the realities of 21st-century state collapse.
  
  

• At its core, the mission is not just about gangs in Port-au-Prince. It is about whether the world still has the will, capacity, and legitimacy to intervene in collapsing states —and whether the U.S. can still marshal coalitions to stabilize its own hemisphere.

The U.S. government’s decision to secure a nearly free 5% stake in Lithium Americas’ Thacker Pass joint venture with GM in Vancouver signals a clear geoeconomic strategy. By embedding national security concerns into the minerals that power electric cars and future industries, it is beginning to penetrate Chinese-controlled value chains.

In perspective. Lithium, often called “white gold,” has become a cornerstone of the energy transition, and whoever controls its supply chains will shape tomorrow’s geopolitics and energy industries. Washington is quietly reshaping the rules of geoeconomics vis-à-vis its Eastern counterpart.

• The U.S. is moving to strengthen domestic and nearshoring lithium mining projects like Thacker Pass, designed to reduce reliance on imports. China, though it holds less raw lithium within its territory, secures access through overseas concessions, competing with Chile, Australia, and the U.S. at the first stage of the value chain.
  
  

• The second—and most important—part of the supply chain is controlled by China. The Asian giant processes and refines over 60–70% of the world’s lithium into battery-grade chemicals, giving it leverage over the most critical chokepoint of the chain, even when raw ore comes from abroad.
  
  

• Beyond refining, Chinese firms dominate cathode and anode manufacturing, battery assembly, and shipping networks tied to Asia, allowing them to control not just the material but also the flow of finished components into global EV supply chains.

Between the lines. The U.S. is developing a new form of strategic staking, using near-free equity warrants and targeted investments to embed itself in critical industries.

• By securing warrants exercisable at USD 0.01, the U.S. government effectively gains a cost-free pathway to equity, turning symbolic support into real ownership whenever needed.
  
  

• The move mirrors earlier U.S. interventions in semiconductors, where Washington has supported Intel and other chipmakers with subsidies, grants, and investment tools under the CHIPS Act.
  
  

• These equity and quasi-equity mechanisms allow the U.S. not only to de-risk private investment but also to build a strategic portfolio across critical sectors (minerals, semiconductors, clean energy). The goal is to exert government influence deep into value chains where market forces alone might leave the U.S. exposed to Chinese dominance.

Why it matters. U.S. government intervention in critical sectors carries financial, market, and geopolitical consequences that shape both valuations and global power dynamics.

• Companies embedded in lithium, rare earth, and semiconductor value chains may trade at inflated valuations as markets price in government backing, creating a kind of “policy premium” disconnected from actual production capacity, profitability, or future expectations.
  
  

• With government backing, Washington reduces downside risk for investors, smoothing the boom-bust cycles of mineral markets but also encouraging speculative flows that may overshoot valuations.
  
  

• These interventions are part of a broader U.S. strategy to reduce dependency on China by reshaping global supply chains. Through securing domestic mining and diversifying refining at home, the U.S. ensures that strategic resources are less vulnerable to Beijing’s leverage.

In conclusion. The United States is deliberately working to constrain China’s dominance in energy and technology markets by reshoring critical supply chains, underwriting domestic production, and embedding itself directly in strategic sectors like lithium and semiconductors.

• This strategy reflects the securitization of markets: once treated as purely economic matters, minerals and advanced technologies are now framed as issues of national security.
  
  

• By tying capital, regulation, and ownership together, Washington is not only seeking to shield its own industries from volatility and dependency but also to limit Beijing’s leverage over the commanding heights of the global economy.

What We’re Watching 🔎 . . .

Trump says US is in ‘armed conflict‘ with drug cartels after ordering strikes in the Caribbean [link]

Aamer Madhani and Lisa Mascaro, AP News

Donald Trump escalated his rhetoric on U.S. drug policy, declaring that the United States is now in an “armed conflict” with Latin American cartels. The statement, delivered in Washington, followed a series of military strikes against alleged Venezuelan drug boats in the Caribbean earlier this month. Trump framed cartels as “narco-terrorists” responsible for more American deaths than any foreign adversary, vowing to expand lethal operations.

The declaration immediately raised legal and geopolitical concerns. The U.S. has not received congressional authorization for the use of military force against cartels, and Mexico has rejected any foreign intervention on its territory. Analysts warn that labeling cartel activity as armed conflict could blur the line between law enforcement and war, potentially opening the door to expanded U.S. military action in the hemisphere. The move risks straining relations with Mexico and the wider region, where sovereignty concerns remain highly sensitive.

Aduanas: botín militar y delincuencia organizada con López Obrador [link]

Proceso

A major investigation has uncovered an unprecedented corruption scheme inside Mexico’s customs system under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. According to security and judicial sources, retired and active officers from the Navy and Army took control of both maritime and land customs, creating a vast network to traffic fuel, drugs, weapons, and vehicles in coordination with drug cartels.

The report describes how more than 500 vessels were used for smuggling millions of liters of fuel, while transport and commercial companies served as cover operations. Losses for Pemex and the federal treasury are estimated in the hundreds of billions of pesos. At least 200 Navy and 150 Army officers are under investigation, with a core group of 15 senior commanders identified as central to the scheme.

The scandal highlights how militarization of customs—meant to reduce corruption—instead entrenched organized crime. It also raises serious questions about accountability inside Mexico’s armed forces at the close of AMLO’s term.