Too Far Left?

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

• Castro’s Ideology Turns Tactical

• Red November Looms in Chile

• Ortega’s Transnational Repression

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Best,

The GCaM Team

Since taking office in 2022, President Xiomara Castro has pursued a foreign policy deeply rooted in ideological projection.

• Under the Biden administration, she explored non-traditional alliances for Honduras without disrupting the regional balance of power.

• However, the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency forced a recalibration of Honduras’ foreign policy playbook.

Panorama. In the early years of her administration, Castro benefited from a relatively favorable international context. The Biden administration, focused on migration stability and international cooperation, gave Honduras room to deepen ties with China—culminating in the severing of relations with Taiwan in 2023.

• It also turned a blind eye to growing diplomatic engagement with Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela. A bilateral agreement with China and ongoing negotiations for a free trade deal marked an unprecedented opening to Beijing, bolstered by Castro’s domestic consolidation of power and the absence of meaningful judicial oversight.

• Foreign policy became a direct extension of the ruling Libre party’s ideological project.

• But in 2025, the geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically. Trump’s return to the White House reinstated a hardline conditionality doctrine—“you’re either with us or against us.” Washington abandoned its hands-off approach, replacing it with a more aggressive stance marked by strict migration demands, unilateral measures, and inflammatory rhetoric toward leftist governments.

Why It Matters. Facing a weakened economy, mounting legitimacy crises, narcotrafficking scandals, and emerging internal disputes within her administration’s inner circle, Castro was compelled to pivot from ideological assertiveness to strategic appeasement.

• The shift began with the reversal of a decision to cancel the extradition treaty with the U.S., initially announced in 2024 but suspended in early 2025.

• Most recently, migration agreements—driven by the U.S.’s unilateral approach—have obligated Honduras to manage the transit and relocation of asylum seekers rejected by the American system.

• Although the Castro government has publicly denied signing such an agreement, the facts on the ground suggest it has been unable to avoid structural cooperation with the Trump administration. In exchange, Honduras has sought leniency on looming tariff threats and political breathing room ahead of elections it is unlikely to win.

What’s Next. For now, Honduras has taken on the role of Trump’s de facto migration enforcer—at least until November.

• This pivot does not amount to a total abandonment of Castro’s original foreign policy ambitions.

• Recent technical and financial agreements with China reveal her administration’s efforts to keep its alternative agenda alive while doing the bare minimum to placate Washington.

• Still, the space to maneuver is shrinking. Confronted with a less tolerant Trump and an unfavorable electoral outlook, the Castro administration has adopted a strategy of tactical retreat: conceding ground to buy time and entrenching a foreign policy framework that will be difficult to unwind.

Chile’s long-standing political moderation is at risk as the country heads toward its presidential election on November 16.

The Big Picture. This past Sunday, the ruling coalition, Unidad por Chile, held its primary elections, delivering a historic result: Jeannette Jara, a member of the Communist Party, will be the unified left’s presidential candidate.

• Jara secured a commanding 60.2% of the vote, followed by Carolina Tohá of the Party for Democracy with 28%.

• Gonzalo Winter of President Boric’s Broad Front trailed with 9%, while Jaime Mulet garnered just 2.8%.

• The primaries saw extremely low turnout—only 10%—but that was enough to hand a decisive victory to the Communist Party.

Why It Matters. Jara is now the first communist candidate to represent a unified left since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. Her nomination signals a troubling erosion of a political culture defined by three decades of resistance to the extremes. The vote reflects widespread disillusionment—both among the general public and within the left itself—toward President Boric’s administration.

• Frustration over the failed constitutional reform, paired with growing anxiety about public insecurity, has created a volatile political climate that threatens Chile’s legacy of moderation.

• On the right, Evelyn Matthei and José Antonio Kast are the frontrunners. Kast, representing the conservative Republican Party with a hardline platform, currently leads polls with up to 28% support.

• More extreme—though not radical—figures such as libertarian Johannes Kaiser have also gained traction within a fragmented yet dominant right-wing bloc.

Between the Lines. While Jara’s primary win has rattled Chile’s social democrats, her chances in the general election remain slim.

• Markets responded positively on Monday, with the Chilean peso rebounding amid speculation that Jara’s nomination improves the opposition’s chances in November.

• Polls currently place her behind Kast and in a virtual tie—sometimes slightly trailing—with Matthei, hovering around 19% support.

• Betting markets, which correctly predicted Trump’s victory in 2024, foresaw Jara’s primary win and now give her a 20.5% chance of winning in November, compared to 25% for Matthei and 49% for Kast.

Yes, But. The right cannot afford complacency. Despite leading in overall support, a divided opposition could jeopardize its advantage. In an all-but-certain runoff, Kast would need Matthei’s explicit backing to consolidate the right, while the left is likely to mobilize its entire coalition. Still, it is unlikely that the social democratic wing will endorse Jara, as evidenced by their poor showing in the primaries.

• Jara’s victory may be a short-term boon for the opposition—but a long-term warning for Chile’s political system.

• The rise of political extremes, coupled with persistent demands for constitutional reform, signals a deeper loss of confidence in the democratic and moderate framework that has long defined Chile.

• The future of Chile’s democratic beacon—one that weathered the social unrest and constitutional turbulence of the Boric era—is now more uncertain than ever.

Ortega’s relentless regime is expanding beyond Nicaragua’s borders, waging political persecution from which dissidents cannot escape—even in exile.

The Big Picture. On June 19, retired Nicaraguan Army Major Roberto Samcam was assassinated in Costa Rica. A former officer in the Sandinista Popular Army, Samcam served in Nicaragua’s military until 1991.

• He had lived in exile in Costa Rica since 2018 due to his outspoken opposition to the Sandinista regime following Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2007.

• Two hitmen, posing as tenants, entered the residential complex where he lived. One of them shot Samcam multiple times at his doorstep.

Why It Matters. Samcam is the fourth Nicaraguan dissident to be assassinated while in exile in Costa Rica.

• In 2022, Rodolfo Rojas was abducted in Costa Rica; his body was later found near the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. In 2023, former political prisoner Erick Antonio Castillo was killed in La Cruz, Guanacaste. In 2024, campesino leader Jaime Luis Ortega—also a refugee in Costa Rica since 2018—was murdered in Upala.

• Joao Maldonado, a former Ortega supporter and Alba employee in Nicaragua, fled to Costa Rica after his father’s arrest during the 2018 Indio Maíz protests.

• Since then, Maldonado has survived two assassination attempts by gunmen on motorcycles, enduring at least 12 gunshot wounds. He has publicly accused the Nicaraguan military and the FSLN of orchestrating the attacks.

Between the Lines. Each of the killings followed a similar pattern of surveillance and stalking in the days leading up to the attack. Crucially, all the victims were either involved in the 2018 protests or had openly criticized the regime’s violent crackdown.

• Costa Rica has become a refuge for hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans fleeing the Ortega regime’s authoritarian grip. But among them, a network of hitmen—allegedly operating at the behest of the Ortega-Murillo regime—has also crossed into the country.

• The recurring nature of these murders and attempted assassinations, along with their shared modus operandi, suggests a systemic and organized campaign of extraterritorial repression: a transnational model of terror targeting exiled opponents.

In Conclusion. Samcam was one of many former Sandinista fighters who transitioned from supporting the revolution to condemning its descent into authoritarianism—especially Ortega’s attempts to extend his rule and establish a dynastic succession.

• Even Ortega’s own brother, Humberto Ortega, fell out of favor and died under house arrest under suspicious circumstances.

• According to a study by the Fundación Sin Límites para el Desarrollo Humano, 59% of Nicaraguan refugees have reported being threatened after fleeing the country—most frequently in Costa Rica.

• Once known for its enviable safety, Costa Rica has now become the operational ground for Ortega’s expanding transnational repression network—one that knows no borders.

What We’re Watching 🔎 . . .

US imposes sanctions on three Mexican finance firms over China fentanyl trade [link]

Christine Murray y Myles McCormick, Financial Times

The U.S. government has imposed sanctions on three Mexican financial entities— CIBanco, Intercam Banco, and Vector Casa de Bolsa—accusing them of laundering millions of dollars for the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels, and of facilitating payments to China for chemical precursors used in fentanyl production.

The sanctions, issued under the newly enacted FEND Off Fentanyl Act, cut the firms off from the U.S. financial system after the Treasury Department designated them as “primary money laundering concerns.”

Vector has rejected the allegations, while Mexican authorities—citing a lack of evidence—have taken temporary control of the institutions and demanded concrete proof before imposing further penalties.

The case has increased pressure on Mexico’s financial system and strained diplomatic relations with Washington, despite recent progress on security cooperation under the administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum.