Marco Rubio: A Threat and an Opportunity for Central America

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

•Marco Rubio: A Threat and an Opportunity for Central America

•The Failure of Petro and Castro’s Anti-Trump Offensive

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The GCaM Team

The southern border of the United States no longer seems to be defined by the Rio Grande, but rather by the Suchiate; Marco Rubio is well-aware of this. Starting next Monday, the newly appointed Secretary of State’s first international tour will take place in Central America. The journey begins in Panama and will include stops in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. 

• With the Panama Canal as the top priority, Rubio plans to visit all Central American countries led by right-wing presidents. 

• Guatemala stands out as the exception to this pattern. Neither Honduras, which has in recent years grown more confrontational vis-à-vis the United States, nor Nicaragua made it onto Rubio’s itinerary.

• Despite not being particularly close to the Trump administration, Rubio’s visit to Guatemala underscores U.S. strategic interests in the nation. The Secretary’s schedule recognizes that the Guatemalan government, despite its self-professedly social democratic bent, is U.S.-aligned.
  
  

Between the Lines. Although the Secretary has expressed a willingness to collaborate with Latin America, the initial actions of the Trump administration suggest a far more adversarial stance. The recent humiliation of left-wing Colombian President Gustavo Petro and the imposition of a 25% tariff on Mexico give a clear indication of what might be expected from this visit; offers of cooperation with the United States come with an implicit “or else,” although Rubio is likely to be far more diplomatic than Trump in explaining the terms.

• The Secretary arrives with two main agendas: immigration and China. This is an entirely correct set of priorities for U.S. interests, since Central America continues being an important source of U.S.-bound illegal immigrants; formerly a pro-Taiwan bastion, it has shifted towards Beijing.

• This tour might well be the first showcase of the new administration’s “carrot and stick” policy, which so far has only wielded the stick. 

• However, not all countries are in the same boat. Among U.S.-aligned nations, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic are seen as the favored ones; Guatemala and Panama, on the other hand, may experience a more confrontational approach. 
  
  

Why it Matters. Rubio perceives Bukele, Chaves, and Abinader as pro-U.S. leaders. Their countries are on the list for forming an alliance to counter the renewed Latin American pink tide. Panama, meanwhile, faces the challenge of resisting Trump’s push to gain control over the Panama Canal. Although José Raúl Mulino, Panama’s president, is generally pro-U.S., his primary concern is now his country’s hold over the canal. 

• Among the countries visited, Guatemala somewhat anomalous due to its left-wing government, yet its strategic location as the “door to Mexico,” as well as the largest country in Central America, makes it essential.

• With Mexico’s cooperation secured, Trump needs Guatemala to bolster his border protection policy. Worryingly for President Bernardo Arévalo, this may entail becoming a safe third country, compelling Guatemala to house foreign deportees.

• Moreover, Guatemala is the largest Central American country by population and GDP, and it still maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Guatemala tends to think of this as a profound symbol of its pro-U.S. alignment, but there are signs that Trump’s support for Taiwan is not unconditional. 
  
  

What’s Next. The Arévalo government needs U.S. approval, especially considering it has now lost the Biden administration’s preferential treatment. Trump does not share many interests with Arévalo, but Guatemala has much to offer in return for support. Both the president and the business sector must discern not just the threats from the new U.S. administration, but also the opportunities. Their priority is gaining Trump’s favor without becoming a safe third country; this clashes with increasingly mature U.S. plans to use Central American nations as buffer states against immigration. 

• Guatemala’s strategy should focus on cooperation with U.S. agencies, via police forces and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to combat illegal immigration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. 

• Regarding China, Guatemala has the chance to position itself as a key U.S. ally in Latin America. Rubio’s visit could be leveraged to turn a potential threat into an advantage. 

• Although not on Trump’s list of close allies, Guatemala has a place at the negotiation table due to its strategic geography and its unusual trade relationship with China.

Last Sunday, Honduran President Xiomara Castro summoned regional presidents to an urgent meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Honduras holds CELAC’s pro tempore presidency for the 2024-25 term. The meeting, scheduled for last Thursday, was canceled on Tuesday for unclear reasons.

• Castro aimed to mobilize Latin American heads of state in response to the brief diplomatic crisis between Colombia and the United States. Colombia had rejected the repatriation of some of its citizens, arguing that deportations on military aircraft were unseemly and humiliating.

• In response, President Donald Trump threatened 25% tariffs on Colombia, adding that the percentage would grow if Bogotá’s defiance continued. Colombian President Gustavo Petro quickly recanted, saving face by offering his presidential jet for repatriation flights.

• Once the dispute was resolved, the summit lost its raison d’être. However, the reasons for its cancellation go beyond the loss of urgency. 
  
  

Historian’s Corner. CELAC was founded in 2011 in Caracas, under the leadership of Hugo Chávez and his counterparts Lula da Silva, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and Rafael Correa. It was created in an attempt to replace the Organization of American States (OAS), which the leftist governments of the pink tide found far too amenable to U.S. interests.

• CELAC, which lacks a parliament, permanent headquarters, or binding mechanisms, serves as a regional coordination mechanism free from U.S. influence.

• It has also been pivotal for China’s consolidation as the largest trading partner for many countries in the region, allowing them to avoid Washington’s political conditions. 

• Thus, CELAC is a bloc instrumentalized by the left to resist U.S. designs and pressures in the region.
  
  

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow. The Honduran summons opened with the following message: “The Pro Tempore Presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, currently held by the Republic of Honduras.” The particular Spanish verb used in the text, ostentar, was seen as an assertion of dominance and authority over the position, which is inappropriate within a multilateral body. 

• A president pro tempore lacks executive power. It is a temporary, and rotating, coordination role that should still hold firm to the principle of first among equals.

• Castro issued the call through an official statement without first consulting CELAC foreign ministers and heads of state. Only Petro had given her the go-ahead.

• The statement’s lack of consultation and pretentious language were interpreted as an insult, as well as a significant diplomatic faux pas, thus diminishing its power.
  
  

Between the Lines. The issue was not just about form, but also substance. The meeting was simply no longer urgent. Although deportations require international cooperation, and curiously, the home country’s willingness to accept its nationals, the meeting was called to multilaterally resolve a strictly bilateral crisis. 

• The other 32 CELAC member-states have no connection to the disputes between Colombia and the United States. In fact, most would like to avoid any involvement, lest they be caught in a similar situation.

• Castro, along with Petro, is one of the region’s biggest critics of the United States. She had a vested interest, beyond purported regional solidarity, in seeing Petro succeed. 

• Castro has attempted to avoid Trump’s deportations, futilely threatening to expel U.S. forces from Soto Cano Air Base if they come to pass. Her country is also desperately reliant on remittances, which make up about 26% of GDP. 
  
  

Balance. Although it is unknown which countries confirmed attendance—Guatemala’s Foreign Minister, Carlos Ramiro Martínez, did so on behalf of his country—the debacle marks the failure of Castro’s aspirations. Petro and Castro aimed to antagonize Trump, but the rest of the region was not as eager.

• While South America is mostly governed by the left, it lacks the ideological forcefulness and coordination of the 2000s-era pink tide. In certain countries, most notably Chile, the left imitated U.S. and Western European models, becoming more U.S.-aligned.

• Potential allies like Mexico and Brazil prefer to adopt a conciliatory and cooperative stance with the Trump administration rather than the antagonism pushed by the more radical left in Honduras and Colombia.