Latin America Readies Itself as Trump’s Cabinet Takes Shape

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

•Latin America Readies Itself as Trump’s Cabinet Takes Shape

•How the Biden Administration Fuels Labor Turmoil in Central America

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•Latin America Readies Itself as Trump’s Cabinet Takes Shape
733 words | 4 minutes reading time

President-elect Donald Trump has spent the days since the November 5 election announcing, or allowing others to leak, his key appointments in piecemeal fashion. For the time being, prospective nominees of all stripes share one key feature: their undying loyalty to Trump’s platform.

• In Latin America, particular attention has been lavished upon Marco Rubio, who is slated to lead the State Department. Trump’s picks for Secretary of Defense and Attorney General—Pete Hegseth and Matt Gaetz, respectively—are heterodox, signalling Trump’s appetite for a radical break.

• Trump has admitted to blunders during his first term, suggesting that a degree of amateurism allowed seasoned Hill operatives, Democrat and Republican alike, to torpedo his political agenda. 

• These misgivings were largely to blame for the much-vaunted reshuffles in Trump’s cabinet. It now appears that the Trump campaign has vetted nominees much more closely, ensuring their ideological alignment.
  
  

Between the Lines. Trump led his party to its victory on November 5 and largely outperformed other Republican candidates. Nonetheless, dissident Republicans may complicate the Senate confirmation of some of his cabinet picks. It is telling that John Thune, an establishment Republican from South Dakota, will succeed Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader. Trump would have preferred Florida Senator Rick Scott.

• Gaetz, who led a hardliner revolt against then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy, is particularly likely to struggle in the Senate. Indeed, old guard Republican John Bolton, whom Trump dismissed as national security advisor in 2019, deems him “the worst nomination for a cabinet position in American history.”

• The Florida Congressman resigned from the House earlier this week. Some suspect this was done in an attempt to keep the House Ethics Committee from publishing its report on allegations that Gaetz had sex with a 17-year-old female. Gaetz denies this, and the Justice Department did not press charges.

• Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Pete Hegseth, and Tulsi Gabbard have also caused concern in the Senate. It has been suggested that if Senate Republicans fail to fall in line, Trump may resort to recess appointments. This could take the form of Trump drawing upon Article II, Section III of the Constitution, an obscure provision that allows the president to adjourn Congress. This would likely require the House’s connivance.
  
  

Regional Echoes. In Latin America, two appointees have led to some concern in regional capitals: Marco Rubio, the presumptive Secretary of State, and Tom Homan, Trump’s “border czar.” Prospective Secretary of Homeland Kristi Noem, who is in her second term as governor of South Dakota, has thus far failed to attract much attention.

• Rubio’s appointment proves the Trump administration will increase its efforts in Latin America, suggesting hard times ahead for strongmen like Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and Cuba’s Díaz-Canel. It is likely that the new administration will reintroduce some sanctions on Venezuela.

• Rubio will be the lead negotiator pressuring Latin American governments to cooperate with the White House’s immigration agenda. Beyond this, he will look askance at Beijing’s growing influence in the region: China’s vast investments in South American strategic infrastructure and its use of Mexico as a middleman for U.S.-bound exports will be high on his list of priorities.

• As for Homan, his particular powers are still unclear, but he remains the best embodiment of Trump’s resolve with regard to immigration. He will also take a more muscular stance against drug cartels. This will likely come into conflict with the Mexican government’s relatively lax security policy.
  
  

Insights. Trump’s particular picks may cause surprise, but thus far, he is doing exactly as promised: engineering a series of executive appointments that will, if nothing else, seek gargantuan reforms to the federal apparatus. Latin America is gradually becoming aware of this reality, which will undoubtedly force changes to its underlying model.

• The region, somewhat neglected by Washington since the end of the Cold War, has only recently grasped that mass deportations are on the cards. The return of Stephen Miller, perhaps the most zealous immigration restrictionist during Trump’s first term, has nonetheless gone unnoticed.

• One cannot speak of an apocalyptic panorama for trade. Chinese influence is likely to be checked, but it is also possible that in exchange for cooperation on the immigration and drug trafficking fronts, Trump will offer commercial concessions and investment commitments.

• Strongmen stand to lose the most under Trump. Colombia and Honduras, where democratically elected governments have increasingly turned against Washington, are also at risk. Further, special attention must be paid to Mexico—largely due to its special trade links to the United States—and the remittance-reliant Northern Triangle states.
  
  

•How the Biden Administration Fuels Labor Turmoil in Central America
803 words | 4 minutes reading time

From its inception in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine has served as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Americas. While some argue that this approach has weakened over time, allowing other powers like China to gain influence in Latin America, it is undeniable that the United States still holds significant sway south of the border.

• In recent years, efforts to curb illegal immigration have been become a key pillar for U.S. efforts in the region, particularly in Central America, which is both a source of migrants and a route for migrants trekking from elsewhere.

• Amid these conditions, the U.S. Department of Labor’s international aid and cooperation initiatives have, perhaps unwittingly, embarked on a course that directly contradicts stated U.S. goals of reducing illegal immigration from the region.
  
  

Overview. In the past decade, the International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) has donated $95 million to NGOs in Central America to implement a series of labor-oriented programs. Some of these are part of the Biden’s administration Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration and promote unionization in the agro-industrial and textile sectors, in the belief that better working conditions and wages should help deter illegal immigration.

• However, in most Central American countries, more than 65% of jobs are in the informal sector of the economy. This means that more than half of workers do not have a steady and reliable source of income, let alone the chance to join—or form—a union. Needless to say, since their income goes unreported, only a small portion of Central American employees file income tax returns.

• This alone raises serious doubts about the true effectiveness of these programs.

• Since 2021, the same year some of the aforementioned programs were implemented, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported more than 10.8 million border encounters, representing a 435.53% surge compared to the period between 2017 and 2020. Within this increase, approximately one-third hailed from Central America’s Northern Triangle.
  
   

Why It Matters. It is clear that ILAB’s approach has not worked and may arguably be worsening the situation. By promoting unionization through third-party NGOs, it may be fostering tensions and conflicts between employers and employees and driving up employment costs. 

• This, in turn, makes it harder for people in marginalized areas to access formal jobs, thereby making them more inclined to consider emigration. Formally employed workers are less likely to emigrate, and these U.S. initiatives tend to make formal hiring more difficult, expensive, and combative.

• It is remarkable that while right-to-work laws predominate in much of the United States, where it is believed that they encourage freer hiring practices, U.S. policy in Central America explicitly targets increased regulation on formal labor.

• The industries involved in these initiatives are crucial for Central America. In Guatemala, for example, agricultural and textile firms account for nearly 20% of GDP and 32% of the workforce, representing a significant share of the country’s overall formal employment.
  
   

Conflict of Interest. Beyond its cited ineffectiveness, many in the region are skeptical about the true motives behind some of these programs. It appears they are aimed at advancing an ideological agenda—a stance that aligns with Biden and Harris’ strong pro-union position throughout their administration and the 2024 campaign—rather than genuinely addressing the issues affecting workers.

• Contributing to this skepticism is the growing impression that U.S. foreign aid to underdeveloped countries may be supporting a financial and political revolving door, in which organizations that support and donate to political campaigns in the United States eventually receive money back in the form of grants.

• The project Improving Respect for Workers’ Rights in Agricultural Supply Chains in Honduras and Guatemala, and the Maquila Sector in El Salvador exemplifies the basis for much of this suspicion. Implemented by the Solidarity Center, an NGO tied to the AFL-CIO, the largest U.S. labor federation, this program is expected to conclude in 2026 and has already received $6.2 million in federal funding.

• Between campaign contributions and outside spending, the AFL-CIO has favored the Democratic Party with more than $29.8 million over the last three election cycles. During Biden’s presidency, the Solidarity Center has received more than $120 million from the U.S. Federal Government, a 120.18% increase compared to what it received during the first Trump administration.
  
  

Balance. Washington’s efforts to reduce illegal immigration and ramp up deportations are likely to foster friction with its southern neighbors. These tensions are further exacerbated by U.S. interventions through programs that serve neither U.S. nor Central American interests.

• While wages in the region lag far behind their U.S. equivalents, the cost of emigration remains high, requiring individuals to leave their families behind and embark on a dangerous journey that claims thousands of lives each year.

• Washington must acknowledge that for most, emigration is a last resort, driven by the scarcity of viable opportunities at home. Limiting these opportunities appears unwise at the current juncture, especially if the United States is seeking an appreciable reduction in immigration volumes.