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How U.S. Sanctions Triggered a Migrant Crisis in Guatemala

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

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Títulos en este boletín

How U.S. Sanctions Triggered a Migrant Crisis in Guatemala

Spain: A Place of Shelter or a Prison Cell for the Venezuelan Opposition?

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How U.S. Sanctions Triggered a Migrant Crisis in Guatemala
610 words | 3 minutes reading time


In November 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned two mining companies in El Estor and Panzós, located in Guatemala’s Izabal and Alta Verapaz Departments, respectively. Although the sanctions were lifted approximately 14 months later, in January 2024, the halt in mining operations led to widespread unemployment and poverty, affecting hundreds of families and driving many to undertake the perilous journey to the United States.

Overview. Today, the Washington Post released the fourth installment of “The Money War,” a series exploring the impact of sanctions ordered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a “powerful yet [relatively] unknown” agency of the U.S. Treasury Department. This edition focused on Guatemala.

  • The report describes the plight of several families that were left in dire straits by the closure of the mines. In the wake of the sanctions, a pronounced rise in unemployment resulted in a sharp decline in local commercial activity, as well as an increase in avoidable deaths due to a lack of access to medication and immigration-driven family disintegration.

  • It should be recalled that the route to the United States is fraught with danger. Several individuals from El Estor died after embarking on their trek to the U.S.-Mexico border; others are unaccounted for and presumed dead.

  • Amid a process marked by irregularities, the sanctions imposed on the two mining firms, Mayaniquel and the Guatemalan subsidiaries of the Switzerland-based Solway Investment Group, have raised concerns among numerous U.S. foreign policy experts. They have long warned against the excessive, irresponsible use of these measures, often based on insufficient information, leading to unintended consequences.

Why It Matters. According to the Washington Post, Mayaniquel’s case illustrates the imprecision with which the United States sometimes imposes sanctions. This is largely deemed a consequence of their increasing and accelerated use, which considerably reduces the amount of time civil servants have to make decisions.

  • Treasury officials must handle thousands of cases and requests, limiting their ability to assess potential collateral effects, to the point of not being certain whether they are sanctioning the right companies.

  • U.S. authorities have not presented evidence justifying the imposed sanctions. As the Washington Post affirms, OFAC officials incorrectly thought Mayaniquel to be a Solway subsidiary, which betrays OFAC's questionable handling of the facts of the case.

  • In January, República gained access to an OFAC letter addressed to the company, in which the agency acknowledges that “based on the totality of the information in our possession, we determine that Mayaniquel does not meet the criteria for designation.”

On the Radar. More than six months after sanctions were lifted, the mining industry in the region remains paralyzed. The Guatemalan government has yet to renew Mayaniquel’s raw ore export license. In August, it reactivated processed ore export licenses for Solway’s subsidiaries. The company is now trying to raise international capital to restart its operations.

Balance. For nearly two years, at least 1,800 families have faced severe difficulties in meeting their basic needs. Indeed, job opportunities do not abound in El Estor, which is located in an impoverished region where the state’s presence is scantly felt. Mining firms represented one of the few avenues to well-paid labor.

  • The companies that faced the most potent weapon in Washington’s foreign policy arsenal join a long list of organizations worldwide that despite their importance to the socioeconomic health of their communities, have been punished with little or no explanation.

  • Guatemala is, of course, entirely U.S.-aligned. Its weak institutions are cause for concern, but the country has no quarrel with Washington.

  • A more careful approach to sanctions would serve U.S. interests. Above all, it would avoid recklessly interfering with entire regions’ economic fabric, which, as can be seen, can only result in increased immigration to the United States.

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PRESS REVIEW

What We’re Watching

In a bid to restore liquidity, CABEI renews Nicaragua’s $200 million loan  [link]

Forbes Centroamérica

The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) recently renewed a $200 million loan to Nicaragua. This loan is part of the Nicaraguan government’s efforts to maintain economic stability, despite facing international sanctions and an internal crisis. CABEI has been one of Nicaragua’s main financial backers in recent years, while other multilateral organizations have reduced their cooperation with Daniel Ortega’s regime. CABEI’s support was particularly visible during the administration of the bank’s previous president, Dante Rossi. Managua, incidentally, has just agreed a $63.86 million loan with Belarus, which has, rather bizarrely, become an important diplomatic partner for the embattled regime. Most of these funds will be used to purchase garbage trucks.

Costa Rican tourism is (for now) resisting the effects of the expansion in drug trafficking [link]

Álvaro Murillo, El País

Despite an uptick in drug-related violence and homicides, tourism remains a key economic pillar for Costa Rica, with more than 3 million visitors projected for 2024. However, risks remain for Costa Rica’s tourism sector, which accounts for 8% of GDP and generates approximately 10% of jobs. This is because the country is facing an unprecedented crime wave; from 2013 to 2023, the homicide rate doubled, reaching 17.2 per 100,000 inhabitants.

The woman who will lead Chile’s counter-revolution [link]

The Economist

Evelyn Matthei is the Chilean right’s leading candidate, displacing conservative leader and former frontrunner José Antonio Kast ahead of the November 2025 elections. Matthei’s policy proposals appeal to Chileans, who are concerned about rising crime and a pervasive economic slowdown. In 2022, the homicide rate reached a record of 6.7 per 100,000 people. Matthei presents herself as a defender of law, order, and productivity. She proposes measures such as introducing drones at the borders to control illegal immigration, in addition to combating organized crime, mainly attributed to Venezuelan gangs. She also addresses issues related to climate change, emphasizing the need for a solution to Chile’s perennial water crisis.

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Spain: A Place of Shelter or a Prison Cell for the Venezuelan Opposition?
639 words | 3 minutes reading time


More than two months after Venezuela’s controversial, widely criticized election, Edmundo González Urrutia, the soft-spoken former diplomat believed by most to be the country’s legitimate president-elect, has fled Venezuela and settled in Madrid.

Overview. On September 8, Edmundo González landed in Spain. This was not without reason: Venezuelan authorities had issued an arrest warrant against him only six days prior. He stood accused of trumped up charges of usurping public functions, forging public documents, instigating the disobedience of laws, conspiring against the state, sabotage, and criminal association.

  • González first sought refuge in the Spanish embassy in Caracas. On September 7, it emerged that he would leave Venezuela for Spain, where the government was expected to grant him political asylum.

  • On Sunday, September 8, Edmundo González landed in Spain. Four days later, he was received at the Palace of Moncloa by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez.

Why Does It Matter? González, who soundly defeated President Nicolás Maduro and openly speaks of the regime’s electoral fraud, left the country without, it seems, the slightest inconvenience. This was deemed remarkable at the time. Days later, it was revealed that such ease of travel was not without a cost: González was made to sign a document recognizing the legitimacy of Maduro’s victory. In return, the regime provided him and his families with letters of transit.

  • The Spanish government was key in this arrangement. This has led to some controversy. Some have interpreted Spain’s position as humane and laudable, while others have said it amounts to collaborating with Maduro’s regime.

  • González admitted that he signed the document under duress. On September 7, Jorge Rodríguez, who leads the Chavista-dominated National Assembly, and his sister, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, visited him at the Spanish embassy.

  • It was there, with the help of Spanish ambassador Ramón Santos, that he admitted defeat in exchange for the possibility of leaving Venezuela. With his departure, all hopes of a more favorable arrangement for the opposition were dashed.

Between the Lines. Prime Minister Sánchez has never hidden his doubts surrounding the “official” electoral results. On July 31, he declared that “in order to recognize the results in Venezuela, each polling station’s results must be verified.” Spain never recognized the results. However, Sánchez arguably relied on the mediation efforts of former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who lobbied to prevent the Group of Puebla, a regional left-wing coalition, from joining the clamor for transparency in the vote counting process.  

  • Zapatero has been denounced in the past for being an agent advocating for Maduro’s interests abroad. This is what happened in 2018, when he was charged with weakening the opposition’s demands for free elections during negotiations that took place in the Dominican Republic.

  • Julio Borges, a former president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, affirms that no one requested Zapatero’s mediation. Rather, Zapatero adopted a “good cop, bad cop” strategy between him and Maduro, all in hopes of advancing the strongman’s interests abroad.

On the Radar. To date, Zapatero rejects negative labels against Maduro. This stance has earned him the widespread hatred of Spain’s vast Venezuela community. According to González, the former prime minister was “the architect promoting that meeting with the Rodríguez siblings.”

  • There are well-known supporters of Maduro within the Spanish left. On election night, Irene Montero, an MEP and former Minister of Equality under Sánchez, said, “The Venezuelan people have elected Nicolás Maduro as president [...] the right must understand that democracy must be respected even when one loses.”

  • While the Spanish left proved instrumental in protecting Edmundo González’s life, it has also served as Maduro’s main guarantor. In granting González asylum, it has effectively solved Maduro’s problem.

  • More than a place of refuge, Spain can be described as a large, comfortable prison cell for González and the rest of the Venezuelan opposition. Indeed, María Corina Machado, the true leader of the opposition, is one of the few figures to have rejected a gilded exile.