Ecuadorians Vote for a Political Déjà Vu

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

•Ecuadorians Vote for a Political Déjà Vu

•Petro’s Cabinet Reality Show Ends in a Reshuffle

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Ecuadorians went to the polls last Sunday. President Daniel Noboa, who has only been in office for the last 16 months, clinched first place by the skin of his teeth. Polls, and especially his supporters, had expected a far more resounding victory. Noboa will now face Luisa González, the Correísta candidate, in the presidential runoff scheduled for April 13.

• Noboa’s was only elected to serve out the remainder of former President Guillermo Lasso’s term. Whoever wins on April 13 will be elected to a full four-year term.

• It should be recalled that in May 2023, Lasso, fearing impeachment over his right-wing, arguably technocratic reforms, triggered the Ecuadorian Constitution’s “mutual death” clause, dissolving the National Assembly and calling a general election. He did not run for reelection.
  
  

In perspective: To eschew the need for a runoff, Ecuadorian law requires a candidate to win over 50% of the vote, or 40% with a 10-point lead over the runner-up. On this occasion, a first-round victory for Noboa was always unlikely, although some polls lent credence to optimistic predictions.

• In the end, Noboa came away with 44.16% of the vote, beating González, who received 43.99%, by just under 20,000 ballots. 

• Both Noboa and González, the latter widely deemed former President Rafael Correa’s heir, will reenact the 2023 general election, where the current president beat González 51.83% to 48.17%.

• Despite internal unrest and a crackdown on drug trafficking, little has changed in Ecuadorian politics since 2023. The battlefield remains divided along Correísta and anti-Correísta lines.
  
  

Internal conflict: Last Sunday’s election took place after the most violent month in Ecuadorian history. Drug cartels, which defined Lasso’s presidency and have been Noboa’s main focus, continue to shape national politics. Just two months into his short term, Ecuador’s youngest-ever president declared war on organized crime—a war that persists with no end in sight.

• Noboa’s approval rating once soared to 80% thanks to his tough stance on organized crime. In his first months in office, it seemed he would enact policies Lasso dreamed of but could not enact due to opposition resistance.

• However, the lack of concrete results from his hardline policies gradually eroded his popularity. Violence continued unabated, becoming particularly dramatic in January 2024, with cartels laying siege to television stations and lynching law enforcement personnel.

• Along the way, his use of emergency powers and a falling-out with his vice president, Verónica Abad, raised fears of an authoritarian streak. This likely would have gone unquestioned with a more pronounced fall in crime.
  
  

Yes, but: Opposition candidate Luisa González represents a return to Correísmo. For some Ecuadorians, this period inspires a degree of nostalgia; high energy and commodity prices allowed Ecuador, an oil exporter, to establish a vast system of now-unsustainable subsidies. For opponents, Rafael Correa’s 10-year rule gave rise to many of Ecuador’s current woes, hollowing out state institutions and quadrupling the country’s sovereign debt.

• It is certainly true that Ecuador’s crime syndicates, above all Los Choneros, rose to prominence during Correa’s presidency, although the vast increase in crime is a relatively recent phenomenon for the country, formerly regarded as a relative abode of peace.

• Indeed, from 2018 to 2023, the murder rate rose from 5.7 to 46.18 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In relative terms, Ecuador went from recording roughly the same number of homicides as the United States to surpassing Haiti. Noboa’s crackdown has achieved a small reduction, with the rate falling to 38.76 in 2024.

• González, for her part, is unwaveringly loyal to Correa, who was convicted on aggravated bribery charges and lives in Belgium. He would likely return to Ecuador and run for office in the event of a Correísta victory.
  
  

On the radar: Ecuador is also in the midst of a vast economic crisis, with GDP contracting by 1.5% and 2.2% in Q2 and Q3 2024, respectively. On several occasions, doubts have been cast on the government’s ability to meet payroll. This, coupled with Noboa’s security measures, which have upset the opposition and achieved scant improvements, puts the president in a difficult situation.

• Moreover, Noboa’s bizarre squabble with Vice President Abad, who is popular among conservatives, has consumed valuable political capital. Disobeying Ecuadorian courts, he has refused to assign her duties and has instead focused on campaigning. 

• Nonetheless, the opposition’s weak campaign allowed Noboa to revert an early pro-González trend in the polls. As it turns out, later polls wildly overestimated Noboa’s popularity, but he remains the favorite.
  
  

Colombian President Gustavo Petro is increasingly isolated. Petro, who was recently involved in a diplomatic spat with the White House, must now contend with trouble at home, where his cabinet has been plunged into disarray and forced into an unplanned reshuffle. 

In perspective: On February 4, Petro opted to broadcast his cabinet meeting live on television. What he intended to frame as an exercise in government transparency instead laid bare the cracks in his administration, revealing a divided Council of Ministers riddled with tensions and interior contradictions.

• The six hours of televised bickering and recriminations triggered a wave of resignations from his cabinet, with some departures labeled as “protocolary,” meaning they were requested by Petro himself.

• Among the most prominent names were Environment Minister Susana Muhamad; Jorge Rojas, head of the Administrative Department of the Presidency; Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia, formerly very close to the president; Interior Minister Juan Fernando Cristo; and Defense Minister Iván Velásquez.

• Since taking office in 2022, Petro’s administration has seen more than 50 different cabinet appointments.
  
  

What stands out: Petro attempted to cast himself as a stern leader by calling out nearly 100 unfulfilled promises made by his ministers. Yet the blame for these unmet goals has landed squarely on his shoulders. The breaking point for his cabinet, however, was his appointment of Armando Benedetti as Chief of Staff.

• Benedetti, a seasoned figure in Colombian politics, played a key role in Petro’s 2022 victory and previously navigated the administrations of Álvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos.

• Benedetti cuts a dark figure and stands accused of substance abuse and mistreatment of women. For Petro’s new right-hand man, ideology takes a backseat, and proximity to power is paramount.

• The biggest controversy stems from claims linking Benedetti to a smuggling ring that allegedly helped fund Petro’s campaign.
  
  

Between the lines: During the broadcast, Augusto Rodríguez, head of the National Protection Unit (UNP), pointed to a possible 500 million-peso (~$121,000) contribution from Diego “Papá Pitufo” Marín to Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. Marín leads Colombia’s largest smuggling, contraband, and customs fraud network.

• According to Rodríguez, Benedetti, leveraging a personal contact, met with Marín during the campaign to arrange the funds’ disbursement.

• If confirmed, this accusation would add to growing suspicions of illegal campaign funding for Petro, whose approval rating stands at a mere 34%.

• Petro has also faced allegations of receiving campaign donations from drug cartels. In 2023, his son, Nicolás, was arrested as part of an investigation into the 2022 presidential campaign. The president denies any involvement.
  
  

Regional echoes. News of former Defense Minister Iván Velásquez’s departure from cabinet was amply discussed in Guatemala, where Velásquez controversially served as head of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). During his tenure, he had remarked that “illicit [political] financing is the original sin of Guatemalan democracy,” calling it “the gateway to the vicious cycle of corruption.”

• Velásquez, who never raised concerns about Petro’s campaign financing, had previously survived a no-confidence motion in the Colombian Senate. On that occasion, he was forced to recognize Colombia’s “terrible lack of safety.”

• The promise of “Total Peace” that Petro entrusted to the former CICIG commissioner largely fell flat. Velásquez leaves behind an 11% spike in homicides in Bogotá, escalating clashes between the military and narco-guerrillas in the Catatumbo region, and the collapse of the peace process.

• The Petro administration, now thrown into disarray, is unlikely to change course. It is ideologically predisposed against embarking on a tough anti-crime program.
  
  

Prognosis: Petro has lost much of his inner circle and some of the few ministers who, by means of their personal prestige, had salvaged his government’s public image. While tensions had long simmered, the televised circus and the inclusion of shadowy figures like Benedetti have blown apart Colombia’s executive branch.

• With a year and a half left to his term, the left-wing coalition that brought him to power has all but dissolved. Colombia will soon enter campaign mode, and Petro will likely have an unusually long lame-duck period.

• All signs point to the revolutionary project of Colombia’s first left-wing government lasting just four years, with little chance of holding onto power past 2026. Petro, of course, is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection.