Disorderly Order

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

• The Paradoxical “Order” of Organized Crime

• Trump’s New Human Rights Playbook

• Runways and Red Lines in Honduras

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Best,

The GCaM Team

Latin America is becoming safer—but at the cost of entrenching and institutionalizing organized crime.

Panorama. Violence trends in the region are encouraging. In 2025, homicide rates have fallen in countries such as Mexico and Brazil—whose demographic weight alone shifts the regional balance—as well as in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, and El Salvador.

• Overall, Latin America is on a downward trajectory in homicide rates, without a clear link to specific public policies—a phenomenon that also occurred globally in 2009.

• Crime is evolving, moving from chaotic and random manifestations to a more ordered phenomenon.

• While this may appear positive, it signals the growing consolidation of organized crime across the region.

Between the Lines. Regional violence began to decline after 2009, fluctuated through the following decade, and dropped sharply during the pandemic. With the return to normal life, crime resurged—until now.

• Public perception, however, tells a different story. The viral spread of brutal crimes and highly graphic imagery online fuels fear, while lingering memories of post-pandemic violence continue to shape attitudes.

• Yet the real turning point in perceptions of insecurity is the rise of organized crime.

Why It Matters. Despite improvements, the region’s most powerful organized crime groups continue to expand their influence, displacing smaller, less organized, and more violent rivals.

• The elimination of these local actors has concentrated violence in fewer hands—hands that deploy it more strategically. A handful of large transnational criminal organizations, particularly the CJNG, have consolidated power and professionalized their operations.

• This partly explains why crime statistics are improving even as public awareness of criminal influence grows.

• When crime is more organized, violence becomes less random, resulting in fewer homicides but more targeted theft and extortion networks.

Yes, but. Violent crime remains one of the leading causes of death in the region, and homicide rates are still among the highest in the world. The fact that 2025 is safer than 2022 in most countries does not mean the problem is solved.

• Certain neighborhoods, cities, and even countries are seeing rising crime despite the broader regional decline.

• Peru faces surging homicide and extortion rates; violent killings have spiked in Sinaloa, Mexico; and while Ecuador’s homicides have dropped, they remain near record highs.

• The reduction in killings—while welcome—should not obscure the reality of a continent still marked by extreme violence and increasingly sophisticated, far-reaching criminal organizations.

For better or worse, the Trump presidency is reshaping the global order—and the human rights paradigm is no exception.

Panorama. The Trump Administration has made clear its intent to significantly scale back criticism of human rights abuses in countries deemed geopolitically important to the U.S., at least from the standpoint that has dominated Western policy in this century.

• This shift will be reflected in the upcoming Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

• Historically, these reports selectively condemned abuses and, at times, served as the basis for foreign policy action. But according to The Washington Post, leaked drafts of the 2024 reports omit references to countries such as Russia, Israel, and El Salvador.

Why It Matters. In its 2023 report, the U.S. State Department cited “significant human rights issues” in El Salvador, including state-sanctioned killings, torture by state agents, and “harsh and life-threatening” prison conditions.

• The leaked 2024 draft, however, claims there were “no credible reports of significant human rights violations” in the country that year. Similar omissions are expected for Russia and Israel, two states involved in the largest conflicts of this decade.

• The Country Reports are typically released between March and April of the year following the review period. As of now, no official publication has been made—a sign of the policy shift under the new presidency.

Between the Lines. Since 1948, human rights violations have been a key tool of soft power, used to morally delegitimize regimes, often those that are undemocratic or misaligned with the West.

• Washington, among others, has at times wielded these condemnations — selectively and sometimes unjustly — to advance political agendas in developing countries.

• While the defense of universal rights has been a cornerstone of global development, the arbitrariness of what constitutes a “human right” has also opened the door to ideological agendas.

• The instrumentalization of human rights is not a Trump invention; his presidency is simply altering its focus.

Bottom Line. The new approach selectively overlooks violations when the offending states are seen as strategically important. In Russia’s case, this aligns with Trump’s goal of easing tensions with Putin to end the war in Ukraine — which, in his view, was triggered by NATO pressure and the Biden Administration’s policies.

• In the cases of El Salvador and Israel, omitting abuses serves to avoid undermining two governments Trump considers key allies, even if doing so risks enabling states that violate the most fundamental rights, including the right to life.

• The new reports will also drop references to government corruption, gender-based crimes, and other abuses historically documented by the U.S.

• Trump is steering U.S. foreign policy toward a pragmatic model, abandoning the notion of defending values above strategic convenience — a return, in many ways, to America’s posture in the first half of the Cold War.

Palmerola International Airport emerged as a public-private response to the outdated and high-risk Toncontín Airport in the Honduran capital.

• During the last administration of Juan Orlando Hernández, public and private funds were combined for its construction, with a 30-year concession granted to Grupo EMCO, which still operates the facility.

• However, after President Xiomara Castro took office, there were severe —and bad-faith—breaches of the contract, with clear geopolitical undertones: undermining the adjacent U.S. military base.

Panorama. Due to the state’s breach of contract, Grupo EMCO has filed a USD 300 million lawsuit against the government of Honduras. The conglomerate claims it has faced indirect expropriation attempts, including operational sabotage, orchestrated by the Castro administration to hinder the airport’s efficiency.

• The state, responsible for developing several infrastructure projects tied to the airport’s administration, has abandoned these works, allegedly to increase Palmerola’s operating costs.

• EMCO further alleges that the government has blocked raw material imports for another of its companies, Alutech, as part of a pressure campaign to force the group out of the airport’s operation.

Between the Lines. President Castro has repeatedly taken aggressive steps against U.S. foreign policy—cutting ties with Taiwan, backing Nicolás Maduro in elections, and suspending extraditions.

• With the recent geopolitical realignment, the exit of a pro-U.S. operator from Palmerola could open the door for a Chinese operator to take control.

• In the context of recent election destabilization through clearly illegitimate mechanisms, the situation could become critical for Washington if Libre (Castro’s party) retains power.

• EMCO could be forced to either withdraw or accept substantial financial losses.

What’s Next. Palmerola has become a political battleground. The international arbitration has turned into a key front of resistance against the Castro government—particularly as Special Economic Development Zones (ZEDEs) have also sued the state for USD 10 billion in breach-of-contract claims.

• A Chinese operator controlling the airport would directly threaten U.S. military logistics in the region, further weakening Washington’s strategic position in Central America.

• Given Washington’s increasingly assertive regional policy—emphasizing security across its sphere of influence, as seen in Panama—the U.S. could ultimately impose a unilateral decision on Palmerola in a worst-case scenario.

Bottom Line. The Palmerola dispute sets a clear precedent: Honduras is emerging as a high-risk destination for investment.

• It marks the second major breach of contract under the current administration, reinforcing an image of instability that deters capital inflows.

• Libre’s government has built a political time bomb ahead of elections—one it may well have placed under its own pillow.