Chinese Influence in Guatemala: A Chat with R. Evan Ellis

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM). In this issue, you will find:

•Chinese Influence in Guatemala: A Chat with R. Evan Ellis (I)

•The U.S. Supreme Court Enshrines the “Imperial Presidency”

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•Chinese Influence in Guatemala: A Chat with R. Evan Ellis (I)
1,099 words | 5 minutes reading time

República recently spoke with Dr. Robert Evan Ellis, research professor at the U.S. Army War College and expert on Latin America. In the interview, he addressed China’s growing prominence in Central America, where only Guatemala and Belize still recognize Taiwan. The first part of the interview can be found below.

Who is R. Evan Ellis? Where does his interest in the region come from?

From a young age, I had a fascination with the world beyond Ohio, my home state. That prompted me to study political science. I worked the first 14 years of my career in the private sector, advising on defense issues and future wars, first with SAIC and then with Booz Allen.

In 2008, I had the opportunity to work with the government, leading a war gaming team with our partners in the region. In 2014, I landed my current position as a research professor at the Army War College. Between 2019 and 2020, I had the unique opportunity of working for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as part of his policy planning staff. This gave me a little insight into the State Department, which I have always kept with me.

What strategies does China use to expand its influence in the region?

First, we must recognize that for China, ending—as much as possible—Taiwan’s autonomy and isolating it from the international scene is a strategic issue. China’s focus on Central America is also part of its strategic competition with the United States.

China generally seeks to achieve its objectives by leading with its state-owned enterprises and deploying its power as a commodities buyer, lender, or investor. Secondarily, but also very importantly, China advances its objectives by weaving networks of influence with the students it takes to China on Hanban scholarships, and also with the people it invites to China: consultants, academics, politicians, journalists, etc.

China always operates locally and relies on its diaspora, making use of China-Country X chambers of commerce and China-Country X friendship societies.

China has expanded undoubtedly its influence in Central America. Could you give us some context?

In the last 20 years, China has mainly succeeded with South American countries, which, although Western in spirit, are relatively distant from a U.S. perspective. In Central America and Mexico, on the other hand, we have had relatively cooperative, conservative governments.

With the shifts in Costa Rica and Panama, then El Salvador, and now Nicaragua and Honduras, we have a group of countries that are [geographically] close to the United States, have governments that are weak in institutional terms, and imperfect when it comes to transparency. China has moved very quickly to advance its infrastructure projects, influence seeking, and training of journalists. 

When we look at Honduras, not only is this noticeable, but also the negotiation of the free trade agreement (FTA), along with Chinese interest in expanding its presence in the regional transportation networks. This is visible in Nicaragua with the Punta Huete airport and the possible rail project connecting Corinto with Bluefields, that is, going from the Pacific to the Atlantic. When we look at the Gulf of Fonseca, we also see the possibility of a Chinese-run port in El Salvador. 

What we are seeing here is a series of governments highly influenced by China, with not-so-good relations with the United States, and with strategic infrastructure projects operated by China. It’s a cluster located very close to the United States that gives China a lot of options, in a way isolating the United States from other allies further south.

You just published an article in The Diplomat describing the pressures that China currently exerts on Guatemala. Would you mind expanding on that?

From a strategic perspective, when we observe the possibility of Guatemala recognizing China, perhaps with an FTA with China, with infrastructure projects, etc., it’s understandable to be concerned, but it forms part of a much broader concern.

China always seeks to weave networks of influence with journalists, sometimes buying newspaper advertisements, sometimes inviting journalists to China. For example, some colleagues of mine have alerted me to a three-month trip to China by Claudia Méndez, who I understand is very important because of her show ConCriterio. Other individuals from the Guatemalan Journalists Association have traveled, including Juan Antonio Canel Cabrera. Canal Antigua’s Mario Rosales has also come up.

This is very consistent with how China works. They then use these networks of influence to speak favorably about China or negatively about Taiwan.

Traditionally, Huawei, which has operated in the region since the 1990s, has been very important, especially in countries that do not recognize China. I was not surprised to learn that Huawei representatives have been very active in Guatemala, with several projects that introduce cyber risks, like the system recently sold to Banrural.

China sometimes begins by weaving networks of influence with importers, exporters, and people interested in doing business with China. Thus, you can see how an automotive group now imports Chang’an vehicles. These relationships don’t take shape overnight; they are built up over years and involve many trips to China.

What about the political side of things?

Informally, some Guatemalan colleagues have told me that after the presidential transition, many people on the conservative end of the spectrum—perhaps very frightened by the way the United States has exerted pressure on various sectors in Guatemala— thought, “Well, if the the United States is going to send us all to prison via extradition orders, we better do like the Ortegas and have other associations and sources of income, just in case things awry."

On the other hand, I understand that President Arévalo and his father are very respected, but Semilla is a diverse group and among this group there are some that are sympathetic toward China and the left. Furthermore, in a way, some associate Taiwan with a legacy of corruption, which Semilla fights against. In my opinion, it’s not entirely fair to lay the blame squarely on Taiwan.

Let’s imagine that Guatemala recognizes Beijing. How would the United States react?

It would be viewed with concern, and an effort would be made to dissuade Guatemala, especially if Guatemala does so by surprise, as Oscar Arias did in Costa Rica and Sánchez Cerén did in El Salvador. But I think that despite this, it is acknowledged that Guatemala can make its own sovereign decisions.

If after [recognizing China] the government begins to collaborate more with China on issues like police training and information architecture, this could lead Guatemala down a path in which, on the one hand, relations with the United States become more difficult, and on the other, the country grows increasingly dependent on China due to its in the large purchases of Guatemalan products and its heft in terms of investments and jobs.

•The U.S. Supreme Court Enshrines the “Imperial Presidency”
542 words | 3 minutes reading time

On June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that U.S. presidents enjoy “absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority.” Donald Trump, and by extension all former presidents, is “entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts.” This immunity, however, does not extend to personal acts.

The immediate effect of this ruling is complicate any attempt to indict Trump for the January 6 Capitol attack. The Supreme Court also identified deficiencies in how the Department of Justice handled its prosecution of some of those involved in the January 6 events, presumably making their release imminent.

It should be recalled that the Constitution, drawing on English convention, grants senators and representatives parliamentary immunity. Various Supreme Court decisions have expanded these rights to the executive branch writ large, including the federal bureaucracy, though never so decisively as now.

The Democrats, eager to prosecute Trump on election obstruction charges, sought to dismiss this legal principle. It backfired: Presidential immunity is now established as an unassailable legal principle and will remain unquestioned for many years due to the conservatives’ hold over the Supreme Court. The three justices appointed by Trump—Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—are 56, 59, and 52, respectively.

Beyond its practical consequences, the ruling has a storied philosophical background. In the 1970s, the liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger criticized the trend toward an “imperial presidency,” under which presidential power constantly increases. For better or worse, the Supreme Court’s decision constitutes an undeniable addition to the presidency’s prerogatives.

Trump’s lawyers argue presidential immunity is logical and not influenced by partisan loyalties; they even claim it could benefit President Joe Biden once he leaves the White House. That said, it is evident that Trump desires to govern as an imperial president; above all, he wishes to be able to take decisive action.

It is known that he seeks to reinforce the border with Mexico, potentially invoking the Insurrection Act of 1807 to deploy the military. Using an ambiguous section of the Civil Service Reform Act, he aims to remove bureaucrats who are hostile to his agenda. He has also stated that he would impose a tariff of at least 10% on most imported goods, with a view to renegotiate trade deals on more favorable terms.

A victorious Trump would return to power with the political experience he lacked in 2017. His lieutenants, particularly in the Department of Justice, would be loyal to his agenda; no Republican would dare challenge his leadership of the party, especially that he has reinvigorated the GOP and armed it with a new platform.

Moreover, a Trump victory would likely lead to the retirement of two conservative Supreme Court justices, Samuel Alito, 74, and Clarence Thomas, 76. Consequently, five of the nine Supreme Court justices would have been appointed by Trump. Such absolute control of the Court could well be Trump’s most significant legacy.

Trump has not been discreet or surreptitious with this. His plans are patently public, and he insists that a president should be allowed to govern and freely implement his political program.

The panic among Democrats, who seem to be distancing themselves from their candidate, albeit perhaps too late, should be understood in this context. If they lose this election, they could face a decades-long political setback.