Brazil’s Centrão Trounces Lula da Silva

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We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In this issue, you will find:

•Brazil’s Centrão Trounces Lula da Silva

•A Brother’s Betrayal: The Fall of Humberto Ortega

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•Brazil’s Centrão Trounces Lula da Silva
660 words | 3 minutes reading time

On Sunday, October 6, Brazil held municipal elections. The results are as varied as Brazil’s expansive geography, but it is now clear that neither former President Jair Bolsonaro nor current President Lula da Silva have a hold on the electorate.

Panorama. With last Sunday’s election, Brazil’s center-right parties managed to continue their winning streak, effectively trouncing the ruling Workers’ Party (PT, left). Indeed, right and center-right parties continue to consolidate themselves as the dominant political forces in the country.

• Bolsonaro now commands a position of strength against the president, but neither of them can claim a resounding victory.

• On the contrary, they suffered significant defeats in the municipalities that mattered most to them: for Bolsonaro, Rio de Janeiro; for Lula, São Paulo, the country’s financial capital.

• The country’s two most important political figures attempted to “nationalize” the election. The electorate revealed, however, that local issues were far more pressing on this occasion.
  
  

Why It Matters. Brazilian municipal elections do not necessarily predict future presidential elections, but they have historically served as a thermometer for legislative elections. In October 2026, Brazilians will go to the polls to elect both a president and their members of Congress. If last Sunday’s results are replicated in two years’ time, this would mean that a left-leaning president would have to contend with a hostile Congress. A right-leaning president, in contrast, would find abundant support.

• The biggest winner this Sunday was the Social Democratic Party (PSD, center-right), which won in 882 of the 5,569 municipalities, 34% more than it obtained in the 2020 municipal elections.

• The Liberal Party (PL, right), Bolsonaro’s party during the 2022 campaign, grew by 48.8% compared to 2020, winning in 552 constituencies. On October 27, it will contest runoffs in another 23 municipalities.

• Lula’s PT, for its part, won in 248 municipalities. This marks an improvement compared to the 182 mayors it obtained in 2020, but it does not come close to the 632 achieved in 2012. In any case, the PT’s relative improvement is overshadowed by the PL’s triumph and the collapse of the other left-wing parties.
  
  

Between the Lines. The Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB, left) obtained 312 mayors, surpassing Lula’s party. However, the Democratic Labor Party (PDT, left), an important ally of the president, lost 166 mayors. The ruling party’s relatively good results conceal the fact that it was widely defeated in the 26 state capitals and has very little chance of achieving any runoff victories.

• In the country’s largest city, São Paulo, the PT did not even nominate a candidate. Instead, Lula supported the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL, left), which will have a very difficult time beating incumbent mayor Ricardo Nunes, of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB, right).

• Nunes—who enjoys Bolsonaro’s support—won 29.48% of the vote, against 29.07% for PSOL’s Guilherme Boulos.

• Despite the small gap between Nunes and Boulos, São Paulo voted largely to the right. A conservative candidate, Pablo Marçal, came in third place, obtaining 28.14% of the vote. Marçal, too, is a Bolsonaro supporter, and his voters are likely to side with Nunes in the runoff.
  
  

Bottom Line. While Lula campaigned heavily for Boulos in São Paulo, Bolsonaro focused his efforts on Rio de Janeiro, where he failed. PSD mayor Eduardo Paes swept the board with more than 60% of the vote. Bolsonaro’s candidate, Alexandre Ramagem, carried a mere 30.81% of the vote.

• For Lula, the elections are a hard blow; they confirm his remarkably scant local influence, despite being the country’s president. With a minority coalition in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, his government lacks political muscle, hence his increasing reliance on Brazil’s politicized higher courts.

• Bolsonaro, on the other hand, needed a better result to strengthen his claim to the right-wing’s leadership. Although his results were far from terrible, they may not suffice to overturn his disqualification for running for office in time for the 2026 election.

• The big winner is the pragmatic, and sometimes corrupt, center-right coalition: the Centrão. With power fragmented into 29 parties, Bolsonaro and Lula, the two most “polarizing” politicians, have lost strength.
  
  

•A Brother’s Betrayal: The Fall of Humberto Ortega
653 words | 3 minutes reading time

On September 30, Humberto Ortega passed away at home in Managua. Humberto, who was dictator Daniel Ortega's brother, had been under house arrest for the previous four months. He was guarded by the soldiers he once commanded as head of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.

• For Daniel Ortega, however, blood is not thicker than water; neither family ties nor the camaraderie born of their shared struggle as guerrilla fighters could withstand criticism of his regime, let alone of his wife.

• The Army surrounded and besieged Humberto Ortega’s residence on May 21, two days after the former military commander criticized the regime, saying it could not hope to survive past his brother’s death.

• The regime argued Humberto’s disappearance from public circles was down to his delicate health. This cannot be confirmed, as computers and phones were confiscated and removed from his residence. Over time, the government announced that his health was deteriorating, hinting at the inevitable.
  
  

Panorama. Without naming him, Daniel Ortega began his brother’s character assassination just a week after placing him under house arrest. He claimed that Humberto had committed treason in 1992 by decorating a U.S. military officer. This ostensibly grievous offense had gone unpunished for 32 years, it appears.

• On May 19, Argentine outlet Infobae published an interview with Humberto Ortega, in which he not only criticized the autocratic nature of his brother’s regime, but also stated that the government would struggle to continue without Daniel as president.

• He argued that after his 79-year-old brother’s death, there would be no legitimate crown prince, so to speak. In Humberto’s view, neither Daniel’s wife, Rosario, who is both first lady and vice president, nor his son Laureano have the authority or legitimacy to continue at the helm.

• These remarks did not sit well with Daniel, who refers to his wife as Nicaragua’s “co-president” and has paved the way for his son to take the reins in the future. In fact, Laureano Ortega is thought to be quite close to China, the regime’s main diplomatic backer.
  
  

Between the Lines. After his passing, the government wasted no time in exalting Humberto Ortega’s legacy. Through official statements and honors that praised his bravery and importance to the Sandinista Revolution, the regime has attempted to mask its role in his death. 

• Humberto Ortega had been cut off from the outside world since the day the military cordon was imposed. From the moment he dared to challenge his brother, sister-in-law, and nephew, he saw nothing beyond the walls of his home.

• Journalists and exiled opposition politicians have largely blamed the regime. Indeed, although Humberto Ortega was 77 years old, it is believed that his death was aided and abetted by the state.

• According to exiled former presidential candidate Juan Sebastián Chamorro, Ortega died “under house arrest and the custody of the Sandinista police [...] Anyone who voices an opinion against the dictatorship is in danger, not safe, even if they are the brother of dictator Daniel Ortega.”
  
  

To Close. Last year, Chamorro told República that Ortega would not relinquish power despite civilian pressure. “I don’t see a political solution at this moment, other than resistance and the denunciation of his crimes,” he said. Ortega has intensified his repression since the 2018 Indio Maíz protests, dismantling all political, religious, and social institutions that could stand against his government. He has a penchant for expropriating assets and banishing his opponents, who are rendered stateless.

• In light of his old age, there is little left for Daniel Ortega to do. Now, he must leave behind a sufficiently weakened state for his dynasty to remain in power.

• This process requires the elimination of any reasonable doubt about the future of the Sandinista project. A voice like that of his brother, though old and weary, was intolerable to the regime’s very survival.

• Ortega knows the future is uncertain once he is gone. Anyone who dares to criticize or attack the regime has two choices: to leave Nicaragua or face an unseemly death, as Humberto did.